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BEING APART FROM REASONS: THE ROLE OF REASONS IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORAL DECISION MAKING BY
CLAUDIO MICHELON JR. (DORDRECHT: SPRINGER, 2006) 189
pages.'
BY MARCOS DE CAMPOS LUDWIG
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Suppose, one fine day, Vincent decides he wants to paint.
Suppose he hires an instructor, acquires the necessary materials for
learning and performing this art, and, finally, begins to paint. Was this a
moral decision? More importantly, has reason played any part in
Vincent's decision-making process? And if so, should reason have
played any part at all?
Such questions, prosaic as they may seem, inspired Cldudio
Michelon Jr.3 to undertake doctoral research at the University of.
Edinburgh ten years ago. There, he reflected on the philosophical
foundations of moral decision making. These foundations stem from the
intimately private, as in Vincent's decision to paint, to the politically
relevant, as in a public agent's decision to budget for a new hospital
instead of, say, new schools. The result of Michelon's insight into this
topic now makes its way into the market as volume 76 of Springer
Publishing's prestigious collection, "Law and Philosophy Library."
Michelon's style of writing makes for pleasant reading, even for
those who may not be acquainted with moral foundations inquiries. The
author has a firm grasp on the subject matter and continuously strives to
achieve clarity in his arguments. The result is an elegant, prudently
drafted text that allows the author's line of reasoning to flow smoothly
and convincingly throughout the entire work. Disagreement with other
scholars' opinions, when it occurs, is expressed respectfully and includes
a fair consideration of the challenged opinion. This approach helps to
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minimize potential criticisms that the arguments presented are hermetic
or ambiguous-a common trap in many philosophical works.
Being Apart from Reasons examines the complexity of moral
decision making and how the different theoretical attempts to simplify
its scope, such as isolating certain kinds of reasons from the moral
arena, are destined to fail. The two main theses are clearly introduced
and carefully developed in the face of challenging rival opinions that
aim precisely at restraining the range of reasons potentially applicable in
moral decision making.
The first main thesis states that ratiocination, i e. recourse to
reason, is not necessarily the best approach to decision making. The first
chapter of the book, "Moral Action, Reason and Inclination," aims
precisely at defining which sorts of reasons could apply to justify (and
even oblige) an agent not to use reason in decision making. The author
proceeds by differentiating "judgment of character" from "judgment of
action"-a step not typically taken by modern philosophers, who are
usually attached to a conception of the human being as "an empty vessel
essentially composed of capacities to reason and to will." 4 This, the
author argues, is because there are other morally relevant features in
human life beyond reasoning. Hence, a given action may be judged
morally correct even when it did not result from ratiocination on the
part of the agent. In other words, the assessment of the processes of
moral judgment is relevant beyond the stricter scope of reasoning
because those processes reveal the agent's character more properly than
a more restrained analysis of his or her actions would.
The author describes character as "something about what kind
of person the decision-maker is" 5 and prudently suggests that morally
good character lies "somewhere in between" the purely rational and the
purely irrational.6 The fundamental point, again, is that "judging
characters is one, if not the only, business of morality,"7 and that the way
a given agent uses reasons when making decisions is not the only
variable to consider when assessing the morality of his or her actions.
Different inclinations, such as justice and mercy, somehow coexist

4Supra note 1 at 45.
5 Ibid.at 174.
6Ibid.at 175.
7 ibid.
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within the human character. Thus, the reduction of the "morally
correct" solely to one or the other is ultimately a simplistic account of
what it is to be human. Guiding this type of tension between different
virtues is precisely the role of another virtue-prudence-that the
author suggests should be understood as having some kind of "metavirtue" status.
The second main thesis offered by Michelon focuses on public
decision making. Michelon argues that decision making by public agents
must always be the result of comprehensive reasoning, meaning that the
decision-maker is supposed to weigh all the applicable reasons to the
case to determine the best course of action.
At least three respected lines of argument have been developed
which lead to a conclusion contrary to the one reached by Michelon: (1)
the liberal argument that public agents should be impartial between
rival conceptions of the good and, as a consequence, are not expected to
reason comprehensively-in other words, reasons for the "right,"
because of its alleged neutrality, should prevail over reasons for the
"good"; (2) the Razian argument that the reliance on reasons provided
by a legitimate authority brings the agent to the right action
independently of the actual result-in other words, "formal" reasons
pre-empt "substantive" ones and thus exclude comprehensive reasoning;
and, (3) the argument that reasons resulting from democratic
procedures are systematically prioritized over other kinds of reasons-in
other words, the procedural value of legal reasons leads to the insulation
of plain moral reasons.
Michelon ambitiously proceeds by criticizing in detail each of
these accounts. To summarize, the neutral liberal argument fails to
insulate "the right" from "the good" because, as shown in a
sophisticated counter-argument developed by Michelon, the moral
agent cannot remain alienated from his or her own decision-making
process (chapter three). The Razian argument fails to insulate formal
from substantive reasons because formal reasons of moral probability
(such as "authoritative directives are probably right") are sensitive to
substantive reasons that contribute to increased moral certainty (such as
"I am sure that this particular authoritative directive is wrong") (chapter
four.). In contrast, Michelon insightfully argues that formal reasons can
be thought of "not so much as excluding comprehensive reasoning, but
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as implying it,"' 8 thus coexisting in persistent tension with substantive
reasons. To use Razian terminology to restate Michelon's conclusion,
insulation of reasons "by weight" is possible, but not insulation "by
kind." Finally, the procedural argument fails to insulate legal reasons
from plain moral reasons based on the alleged rational authority of the
parliament. This is because, according to Michelon, the procedural
argument does not cope with the complexity of actual practical
reasoning (as in Waldron's account) or because it fails to demonstrate
empirically that a certain kind of law-making procedure assures proper
consideration of all the reasons available in society (as in Habermas'
account) (chapter five).
One important step in Michelon's reasoning, especially in his
critique of Raz, is the distinction he draws between reasons for action
and reasonsfor deciding.While the former are understood as "a fact or
set of facts whose occurrence in the world makes it correct to perform a
given action,"9 the latter refer to those reasons "one takes, or should
take, into account in a deliberative process."1 Although both sorts of
reasons are practical, Michelon suggests that political power can create
reasons for action only, in the sense of stimulating or attempting to
avoid certain behaviour, but not reasons for deciding.Underlying this
argument is a philosophical resistance to interference on the part of the
political authority in the subject's autonomy-a sort of intervention that
Raz's normal justification thesis not only implies, but actually attempts
to justify.
This book provides valuable and provocative insight even for
those scholars defending the arguments that Michelon ultimately
criticizes. With respect to Michelon's first main thesis on the limited
room for reasoning in personal, intimate decision making, it might be
argued that the connection between morals and law could have been
explored in more detail by the author. From a moral point of view,
Vincent's decision to paint may be a relevant subject for an assessment
of its morality; however, it is not as clear from Michelon's text if and
when this sort of intimate decision is legally relevant. In other words,
while the connection between morals and law is certainly assumed by

8
9

Ibid.at 177.

1bid. at 114.
1
9Ibid at 115.

20071

Book Reviews

Michelon, a reader with legal training might be disappointed at the
absence of a plain account of what makes law, specifically, a realm
somewhat autonomous from morals. But then, even the title of the book
indicates that the fundamental concern of the author is not with the
legal, but rather with the moral aspects of decision making. Plus, both
main theses submitted by the author aim primarily to expose the
insufficiencies of rival theories, rather than to explain a comprehensive
theory of his own.
Even readers who are not persuaded by Michelon's arguments
after completing the book may profit from several insights that allow for
further theoretical reflection. One might wonder, for instance, how the
author's first main thesis, on the role of virtues beyond ratiocination in
moral decision making, might contribute to the debate surrounding the
character of legal adjudication in comparison to law-making. It has been
suggested that justice should be seen as the defining virtue of
adjudication, or the administration of law." Other virtues, such as
charity and temperance, should not be expected from judges or courts,
but from. legislators,which are supposed to produce law that is "more
than just," in a certain sense."
Another promising line of inquiry is the extent to which
Michelon's second main thesis, arguing for comprehensive reasoning in
public decision making, may apply to other contexts beyond decision
making by public agents. Is it plausible to suggest that comprehensive
reasoning will be required whenever the agent is expected to act in the
interests of others? For example, what reasoning is required from a
director or manager who is expected to decide and act in the best
interests of the company? Or, what is the decision-making approach for
a franchisor who intends to implement a network-wide policy affecting
the situation of the franchisees by exercising discretionary powers that
are typically granted in franchise agreements? Should comprehensive
reasoning be required from these agents? In essence, what distinguishes
public decision making from private or personal decision making, such

" John Gardner, "The Virtue of Justice and the Character of Law" (2000) 53 Curr. Legal
Probs. 1 at 29.
2 Ibid. See also at 30: "[Jlustice is the first virtue of those institutions-adjudicative
institutions-whose job it is to mop up when things have already gone wrong. Not only corrective
justice, but justice tout court, is a remedial virtue. It is a virtue for dispute-resolvers and disputeanticipators" [footnote omitted].
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that comprehensive reasoning is required in the former but not in the
latter context?
In sum, whether the reader agrees or disagrees with the line of
reasoning followed by the author, Michelon's voice deserves to be
included in any academic debate about the moral foundations of law.

